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1. Introduction
In the paper we present a part of the economics of crime – individual
decision-making to commit a crime. This theory started appearing in
the literature in the 1960s and especially in the 1970s in an attempt
to describe and predict human behavior concerning issues such as offence
and crime. Several models have been developed and we discuss them in
turn, especially the studies of Becker (1968), Ehrlich (1973) and Heineke
(1978).
Because the success of offence is naturally uncertain in these models, we
deal with the maximization of the von Neumann-Morgenstern expected
utility function. Moreover, we consider the offence risky and therefore en-
counter portfolio models where the individual allocates the wealth among
legal and illegal activities. It is also reasonable to assume that these acti-
vities have a time dimension. As a result, individuals allocate time to le-
gal and illegal activity. Determining the level of crime committed it is pos-
sible to derive the corresponding supply curve. The early models of the
economics of crime are similar to the models of portfolio choice and of
the supply of labor.
We do not include in our survey the theory of optimal law enforcement.
This theory extends the theory of individual decision-making in several as-
pects e.g. in the analysis of how law enforcement agents should deal with
the unproductive behavior of those who commit crime in order to maximize
social welfare. For a survey see (Polinsky – Shavell, 2000). The models of
individual decision-making to commit crime are closely related to modern
dynamic theories on tax evasion. The survey is in (Slemrod – Yithzaki,
2002).
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the authors.We assume that economic agents are rational, in other words, they ful-
fill the following assumptions in their preferences: completeness, transiti-
vity, reflexivity, nonsatiation, continuity, and strict convexity. These as-
sumptions are sufficient conditions for rational behavior. Due to our
assumptions we realize that our analysis of decision-making to commit
a crime is most suitable to apply to areas such as the level of pollution that
firms generate, robbery, tax evasion or traffic offence. The applicability of
these models to emotional crime – or more generally to the case of unstable
preferences – is in our opinion ambiguous.
Recently, there has been plenty of theoretical and empirical literature
on the problem that individuals do not behave fully rationally.1 But even
if we find that individual decision-making is not always rational (which
can actually be caused, to a large extent, by the optimization of the amount
of information to be evaluated or by learning), we can think of it as a use-
ful approximation of reality.
In section 2 we present portfolio models on individual decision-making
to commit a crime. We discuss the model of time allocation in section 3. We
present our conclusions in section 4, followed by two appendices on the de-
rivation of some results of Heineke’s model I.
2. Model of Dividing an Individual’s Wealth between Legal 
and Illegal Activities
In this section we present the model of dividing an individual’s wealth
between legal and illegal activities. We assume that individuals maxi-
mize the well-defined von Neumann-Morgernstern expected utility func-
tion. As a result, the theory of individual decision-making to commit
a crime is the special case of the general theory of rational behavior un-
der uncertainty. An individual’s wealth consists of an exogenous (initial)
wealth and additional income obtained from legal and illegal activities.2
Legal activities are without risk. Individuals are able to estimate the pro-
bability of all possible opportunities and monetize all the gains and los-
ses.3
The models of rational behavior tocommit crime in formal economic terms
appear in the literature from the 1960s, starting with Becker’s (1968) pio-
neering article Crime and Punishment.4 However, the first attempts
to study crime from an economic point of view date back to the 18th and
19th centuries (see (Eide, 1994, p. 48)).
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1 For a survey of various attitudes towards rationality see (Hamlin, 1986, pp. 1–57). Ashort sur-
vey of early models of the economics of crime is provided by (Milanovic, 1999, pp. 5–11).
2 Brown and Reynolds (1973) introduce the distinction between initial and additional income.
3 If we challenge the strict monetization, the results of the early models become more ambi-
guous. See (Block – Heineke, 1975).
4 However, there were also some unpublished manuscripts at Columbia University before 1968
such as (Smigel-Leibowitz, 1965) or (Ehrlich, 1967) focused on empirical assessment of crime acti-
vities in the U.S. Becker (1996, p. 143) also writes: “I began to think about crime in the 1960s af-
ter driving to Columbia University for an oral examination of a student in economic theory.”2.1 Becker’s Model
Becker (1968) primarily focuses on minimizing the social loss in income
from the crime and not only on the individual decision-making.5 His ar-
ticle is a seminal work on the economics of crime in formal economic terms
and is the basis for all further research.
Becker (1968) argues what is the optimal policy in order to combat crime
and how it relates to the means of punishment, public expenditures, pro-
bability of conviction, and private enforcement of law. Thus optimal poli-
cies to fight crime are part of the optimal allocation of resources. We dis-
cuss especially the parts relevant to our survey.
Another of his results is that crime is socially undesirable since the po-
tential offenders spend their time planning and implementing the crime,
in other words on unproductive activities, which in turn causes only a vi-
olent income redistribution in society. In the modern literature this beha-
vior is called rent-seeking.
Becker (1968) also discusses the economics of crime from the point of
view of the individual and stresses the rationality and the liability of
the actions. The individual compares the benefits and the costs of com-
mitting a crime (or offence). The crime is committed only if g>p f ,where
g is the gain from the crime and the term pf is expected punishment
(p stands for probability of punishment and f for fine). Moreover, from
the point of view of the enforcer it is rational to increase fines and lower
the probability of punishment so that the expected punishment would not
change. The only limitation is the offender’s wealth.6 Clearly, it might be
difficult for the offender to pay a fine greater than his entire wealth and
for theenforcer tocollect thefine. However, if this is true, why does thesub-
stitution between fines and probability of punishment have weak empi-
rical grounds?
There are at least two answers. First, the enforcer is not led by economic
reasoning purely. Vaguely defined justice plays an important role in for-
mulating the enforcer’s policies.7 Second, Polinsky and Shavell (1979) re-
fine Becker’s results by considering the attitude towards risk. This toge-
ther with therecent model of Garoupa (2001) explains why we do not observe
this substitution in reality. Garoupa (2001) shows that substitutability be-
tween the probability of punishment and fine holds only if the expected pu-
nishment is close to the gain from the crime.8 Otherwise, the relationship
can be complementary.
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5 Becker (1968) does not distinguish between exogenous (initial) wealth and additional income
obtained from legal and illegal activities. In this sense, it is disputable to include his model in
this section, but all subsequent research comes from its model.
6 See (Polinsky – Shavell, 1991) for a formal model where differences in wealth are introduced.
7 Just imagine the case of free-riding on public transportation and being asked (though with
probability close to zero) to pay a fine close to your entire wealth.
8 Garoupa mentions the following hypothetical case: if the wealth of the offender is zero, it ma-
kes no sense to enforce, if the wealth becomes positive, then it is rational for enforcement agents
to consider to act.Becker (1968) deduces that the greater elasticity of the change in the pro-
bability of punishment over the elasticity of response to the change in fi-
nes implies that offenders are marginally risk-lovers. Brown and Reynolds
(1973) generalize Becker’s model risk implications about entering into il-
legal activities by showing that relevant elasticities imply nothing about
risk attitudes. Later on, there is vast theoretical literature refining the re-
sults of Becker’s model, such as Ehrlich (1973), Polinsky and Shavell (1979,
1991, 1999) and Garoupa (2001).
2.2 Heineke Model I
Heineke (1978) adds interesting aspects to Becker’s model and to the mo-
dels on tax evasion9 from the early 1970s. He enriches both the models of
portfolio choice and previous models of the economics of crime.
In the model the following notation is used:
W0 – initial wealth,
x – amount of illegal activity, 0   x   1,10
W = W(x) – wealth is a function of illegal activity,
g (x, α ) – gain from offence, ∂ g/∂ x > 0, ∂ g/∂α > 0, g (0, α ) = 0,
f (x,ß) – fine from offence, if detected11 ∂ f/∂ x > 0, ∂ f/∂ ß > 0, f (0, ß) = 0,
α  – a shift parameter for gains (magnitude of the gains),12
ß – a shift parameter for losses (severity of the losses),
p – probability of detection,
WS – wealth when being successful (no fine imposed),
WU – wealth when being unsuccessful (fine is imposed on the offender),
u (W) – von Neumann-Morgenstern utility, ∂ u/∂ W > 0,13
WS = W0 + g (x, α )
WU = W0 + g (x, α ) – f (x,ß).
The individual’s maximize expected utility (EU):
E[U(W)] = (1 – p)u(WS) + pu(WU) (1)
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9 For a contemporary survey of the literature on tax evasion see (Slemrod – Yithzaki, 2002), for
tax evasion models preceding Heineke’s model I, see (Allingham – Sandmo, 1972), (Kolm, 1973)
and (Singh, 1973).
10 Multiplying x by 100, we can interpret how many percent of the individual’s activity is as-
signed to illegal. Moreover, it is conventionally assumed that the decision-maker divides his/her
exogenous initial wealth, W0 , between legal and illegal activities, hence W0   x. An implication
of this is that W0 is normalized as well.
11 We assume for simplicity that detection is equal to punishment. That is there are no costs
to impose a fine.
12 E.g. an increase in a moves the function g upwards. The reasoning is similar for other shift
parameters.
13 If ∂ u/∂ W∂ W > 0, then the individual is a risk lover, if ∂ u/∂ W∂ W < 0 than the individual is risk
averse, if ∂ u/∂ W∂ W = 0, than the individual is risk neutral.∂ EU               ∂ u         ∂ g       ∂ u          ∂ g    ∂ f
µ ≡  –––– = (1 – p) –– (WS) –– + p –– (WU) (–– – ––) = 0 (2)
∂ x                 ∂ x         ∂ x       ∂ x           ∂ x    ∂ x
It is clear from the first-order condition that such optimum can exist,
since the first term in equation (2) is positive and the second term is ne-
gative.14 It is natural to expect that ∂ g/∂ x < ∂ f/∂ x, that is the additional
gain from crime should be less than the additional fine, otherwise all in-
dividuals would commit as much crime as possible. On the other hand,
the condition for committing additional crime is:
∂ g       ∂ f
–– > p –– (3)
∂ x       ∂ x
which means the additional (marginal) gain has to be greater than the ex-
pected additional fine.
To make sure that we found the maximum of the expected utility func-
tion; the second derivative of the equation (1) must be negative:
∂ EU               ∂ u          ∂ g  ∂ g              ∂ u           ∂ g           ∂ u
–––– = (1 – p) ––– (WS) –– –– + (1 – p) –– (WS) –––– + p –––– (WU)
∂ x∂ x              ∂ x∂ x        ∂ x ∂ x               ∂ x          ∂ x∂ x       ∂ x∂ x
(4)
∂ g  ∂ g        ∂ u           ∂ g          ∂ u           ∂ f  ∂ f       ∂ u          ∂ f
–– –– +  p –– (WU) –––– –  p ––– (WU) –– –– – p –– (WU) ––– < 0
∂ x  ∂ x        ∂ x         ∂ x∂ x       ∂ x∂ x        ∂ x ∂ x       ∂ x ∂ x∂ x
We can see that inequality (4) can be satisfied independently on the at-
titude towards risk.
After the exclusion of potential corner solutions (x = 0, x = 1), we can find
the individual’s response to the change of parameters. In other words, how
much would a maximizing individual dedicate to illegal activities when
there is a change in his/her wealth, the probability of detection, the size of
gain and the severity of losses? Under the constant absolute risk aversion
we obtain:15
∂µ /∂ W = 0 (5)
This means a change in wealth will not affect the incidence of an indi-
vidual’s illegal activities.
Under the decreasing absolute risk aversion we have:
∂µ /∂ W > 0 (6)
As a result, more wealth will bring more crime. Wolpin (1978) shows
a rather surprising conclusion from equation (6). Illegal activity decreases
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14 Because p and ∂ u/∂ W > 0 and ∂ g/∂ x – ∂ f/∂ x < 0.
15 See Appendix 1 for a derivation of the results of how the optimal value of x changes with
the change of wealth. For more on the behavior towards risk, see (Eide, 1994, pp. 76–80), (Va-
rian, 1992, pp. 177–197) or (Mas-Colell et al., 1995, pp. 183–199).with increasing unemployment, since a higher unemployment rate implies
lower income. The opposite would be intuitively expected. Notice an in-
teresting feature that in this case we cannot explain with the perception
quoted by Eide (1994, p. 56): “[...] misery creates a situation where crime is
a rational reaction.” Social norms as Eide (1994) argues can be appropri-
ate for explaining this problem.
On the other hand, using the results of Polinsky and Shavell (1999) and
Garoupa (2001) we may argue that it is possible to explain equation (6) by
rational behavior at variance with Eide (1994). Low wealth means low op-
portunity costs and alow probability of being fined by asubstantial amount.
This inevitable change in the other parameters may in turn explain why
equation (6) stands under rational behavior, too.
Under the increasing absolute risk aversion we end up with:
∂µ /∂ W < 0 (7)
This means higher wealth contributes to lower illegal activity. Intuiti-
vely, one may expect this result. However, it is important to bear in mind
that one’s attitude towards risk might be unstable with respect to a sub-
stantial change in wealth. Anindividual with sufficiently low income might
enjoy higher expected utility from committing an offence when his/her in-
come slightly increases. Nevertheless, the reverse might happen when in-
come rises substantially (increasing absolute risk aversion assumption
with middle-income individuals). In a similar manner, the argument for
low-income individuals might be made as well for high-income individu-
als.
Next, we can derive under some reasonable assumptions the following
outcomes:16
∂µ /∂β < 0, ∂µ /∂ p < 0 and ∂µ /∂α > 0 (8)
The results from equation (8) are as follows: more severe punishment
causes less crime, as well as a higher probability of detection. On the other
hand, higher gains from crime make an individual more likely to get in-
volved in illegal activities. If more severe punishment causes less crime
and the most severe punishment is capital, does it mean that we have
a straightforward argument in favor of capital punishment? Laying aside
“noneconomic” arguments, we can undermine the idea of capital punish-
ment by introducing non-static interactive decision-making (the notion of
marginal deterrence) and incomplete information. The popular example is
a bank robbery. A robber, closed in upon by police, and knowing that capi-
tal punishment is highly probable, would have for example no incentive
to spare the life of a potential hostage. Here we considered at least two
time periods. Introducing nonstatic interactive decision-making reverses
the results in this case completely. Another issue is nonperfect foresight
and incomplete information. Once we introduce this concept, it is also li-
kely to sentence an innocent individual to death.
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16 See Appendix 2 for derivation.3. Model of Time Allocation
A possible limitation of the portfolio models (Heineke model I in the last
section) is that an individual not only has to decide about the optimal le-
vel of crime, but also to consider time as an important variable influencing
the decision-making.17 As a result, we encounter models where time is ex-
plicitly allocated between legal and illegal activities. We redefine the pro-
blem of the individual’s maximizing the expected utility as follows:
E [U (W)] = (1–p) u (WS) + pu (WU) (9)
where:
WS = W0 + L (tL,δ ) + G(ti,χ ),
WU = W0 + L (tL,δ ) + G (ti,χ ) – F (ti,ψ ),
L (tL,δ ) – function of benefits and costs depending on tL,
tL – time spent on legal activity,
δ  – a shift parameter for L (tL,δ ),
G (ti,χ ) – gain from the illegal activity,
ti – time spent on illegal activity,
χ  – shift parameter for G (ti,χ ),
F (ti,ψ ) – loss, if punished,
ψ  – a shift parameter for F (ti,ψ ).
The individual maximizes the expected utility with respect to ti (time
spent on illegal activity) and tL(time spent on legal activity). Because theal-
gebra is very similar to the portfolio model, we do not present the deriva-
tions.18 All the assumptions from the previous model apply, too.
There are two possibilities how to deal with the model. The first, as dis-
cussed by Heineke (1978), is the general model with nonfixed leisure time.
Hence, ti +t L +t R =t , where t means time and tR is leisure time and both
are positive real numbers. The second model does not allow tR to vary, this
means that leisure time is fixed. The second model is developed in Ehrlich
(1973).
3.1 Heineke’s model II
An individual will maximize the following with respect to tL and ti:
E [U (W)] = (1–p) u (WS) + pu (WU) (10)
The resulting first-order conditions are:
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17 Generally, one may convert time-allocation decision-making to allocation of costs (benefits).
Despite this fact, time-allocation models work within a more general context (especially Ehr-
lich’s model, see (Ehrlich, 1973, pp. 522–523)) and explicitly allow for capturing the effects of
switching from one activity to another. Moreover, the time allocation models explicitly take into
account leisure time as well.
18 See (Ehrlich, 1973), (Heineke, 1978) or (Eide, 1994) for a survey.∂ EU             ∂ u        ∂ L ∂ u         ∂ L
–––– = (1–p) –– (WS) –– + p –– (WU) –– = 0 (11)
∂ tL ∂ tL ∂ tL ∂ tL ∂ tL
∂ EU             ∂ u         ∂ L ∂ u           ∂ G   ∂ F
–––– = (1–p) –– (WS) –– + p –– (WU)  
–– – –– 
= 0 (12)
∂ ti ∂ ti ∂ ti ∂ ti ∂ ti     ∂ ti
The optimal value of tL depends on the benefits and costs arising from
legal activities and is independent of p, W0, χ and ψ (probability of detec-
tion, initial wealth, the magnitude of gains and the size of the imposed fine
respectively).19 But an increase in wealth causes the individual to alloca-
te more of his/her time to legal activities. When ∂ L/∂ tL = 0 (the marginal 
benefits reach zero), one will exert oneself to illegal activities. Again,
the examples from the “real world” are clear. One may imagine the case
where an individual is able to earn legally only a relatively low income (e.g.
due to low abilities or low productivity of the firm before restructuring in
a transition period), and where there may then be a temptation to get in-
volved in illegal activities. Moreover, if we consider far less than perfect
law enforcement in the beginning of the transitional period, we might ex-
plain a significant part of the crime activity through models of individual
decision-making and of optimal law enforcement. It is also possible to de-
rive the following inequality:
∂ ti/∂ p < 0 (13)
The time involved in illegal activity naturally decreases as the probabi-
lity of punishment increases.
The outcome of change in the severity of punishment, the magnitude of
gains, gains from legal activities and increase of wealth on time allocated
to illegal activities (sign of these partial derivatives ∂ ti/∂Ψ , ∂ ti/∂χ , ∂ ti/∂δ and
∂ ti/∂ W respectively) depends on the attitude towards risk.
In the case of constant absolute risk aversion we get:
∂ ti/∂χ > 0, ∂ ti/∂Ψ  < 0, ∂ ti/∂δ = 0, ∂ ti/∂ W = 0 (14)
This means, if there is an increase in the gains from the illegal activi-
ties, the individual will concentrate more on it. If the punishment from il-
legal activities is more severe, then everybody decreases their illegal acti-
vities. Increase in the wealth and the magnitude of gains does not influence
illegal activities.
In the case of increasing absolute risk aversion we obtain:
∂ ti/∂χ > 0, ∂ ti/∂Ψ  < 0, ∂ ti/∂δ < 0, ∂ ti/∂ W > 0 (15)
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19See (Eide, 1994) for mathematical derivation. Thetechnique is roughly thesame as in theport-
folio model and we do not present it. In the interest of saving space, we also do not always pro-
vide the comprehensive commentary to the equations, where the results are the same as for
the portfolio model from the previous section.The results in equation (15) show that an individual devotes less time
to illegal activities when a higher severity of punishment is present and
when there are better legal opportunities. Increase in the wealth and
the magnitude of gains makes the individual tend more towards illegal
activities. The results for decreasing absolute risk aversion are the follo-
wing:
∂ ti/∂χ > 0, ∂ ti/∂δ > 0, ∂ ti/∂ W > 0 (16)
Higher potential gains as well as higher wealth from illegal activities
cause higher crime. Better legal opportunities do not have a negative in-
fluence on the incidence of crime committed. The consequence of varied se-
verity of punishment at the level of crime (the sign of ∂ ti/∂Ψ ) is indetermi-
nate.
If there is a large independence between legal and illegal activities,
the model yields the same result as portfolio Heineke model I.
3.2 Ehrlich’s Model
We discuss the model of Ehrlich (1973) in this section. In this model we
assume that the total time is fixed and has to be divided between legal and
illegal activities. As aresult, themore time spent on legal activities, theless
may be spent on illegal activities and vise versa. We can rewrite the wealth
depending on success in the following manner:
WS = W0 + L (t–ti,δ ) + G (ti,χ )
WU = W0 + L (t–ti,δ ) + G (ti,χ ) – F (ti,Ψ )
The first-order condition of the optimization of the allocation of time is:20
∂ EU               ∂ u            ∂ L ∂ G   ∂ F               ∂ u          ∂ G   ∂ L –––– = (1 – p) –– (WU)  
– –– + –– – –– 
+ (1– p) –– (WS)  
–– – –– 
= 0 (17) ∂ ti                        ∂ ti                    ∂ ti      ∂ ti      ∂ ti                        ∂ ti                ∂ ti     ∂ ti
Rearranging leads to:
∂ G   ∂ L ∂ u
–– – ––             p –– (WU)
∂ ti ∂ tL ∂ ti ––––––––––– = ––––––––––––– (18)
∂ G    ∂ L ∂ F               ∂ u –– – –– – ––     (1 – p) –– (WS)
∂ ti ∂ tL ∂ ti                      ∂ ti
The term on the right-hand side describes the individual’s indifference
curve. After differentiating equation (10) with respect to W and setting 
dE [U (W)] = 0, we have:
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20 The second-order condition assures the maximum, see (Ehrlich, 1973, p. 527).∂ u
p –––– (WU)
dWS ∂ WU
–––– = ––––––––––––––– (19)
dWU                        ∂ u (1 – p) –––– (WS)
dWS
One can also see that the left-hand term in equation (18) is the margi-
nal rate of substitution between WS and WU given the overall time con-
stant. As ti increases, it will produce a transformation curve, where WS is
substituted for WU according to the following equation:
∂ G   ∂ L
–– – ––             
∂ ti ∂ tL dWS
––––––––––– = –––– (20)
∂ G    ∂ L ∂ F    dWU
–– – –– – –– 
∂ ti ∂ tL ∂ ti     
In other words, the transformation curve is an opportunity boundary (ana-
logy of budget line) of the individual and is modeled explicitly compared
to the previous models. Equation (18) is a necessary and sufficient condi-
tion for a strict global maximum, if the individual exhibits dimini-shing
marginal utility of wealth as well as diminishing additional wages and con-
stant or increasing marginal penalties.21 Equations (18), (19) and (20) de-
termine the optimal time allocated to legal and illegal activities (point B in
Figure 1). If all the time were devoted to illegal activities, then the indi-
vidual’s optimum would become point C. In addition, if there is only legal
activity, the individual will end up at point A. Notice also that the certain-
ty line must lie at the angle of 45°, since we assume that legal earnings
are certain and also gains and losses [G (ti, χ ) and F (ti, Ψ )] are zero and
then WS = WU. Naturally, the transformation curve’s domain is  W0 + G (t) –
–  F (t),  W0 +  L (t)  and its relevant range is  W0 +  L (t),  W0 + 
+ G (t)  (see Figure 1).
It can be also shown that if a risk-neutral person chooses point B in Fi-
gure 1, then the optimum for the risk-lover must be to the left of point B
on the transformation curve and to the right for a risk-averse person.
It is clear that individual participates in illegal activities if his/her ex-
pected utility increases. To state this formally: 
∂ EU –––– > 0 (21)
∂ ti
Concretely, when there is no illegal activity, WU =W S and thus uU =u S.
Putting equation (19) and (21) together, after rearranging we obtain:
∂ G   ∂ L ∂ F p –– – –– > p –– (22)
∂ ti     ∂ tL ∂ ti
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21 That is, for the transformation curve to be concave (strictly or not) and the indifference curve
strictly convex to the origin.The marginal differential gain must exceed the expected punishment in
order for crime to occur.
Ehrlich’s analysis goes beyond Becker (1968) in some aspects, since
the model explicitly explores not only costs, but also benefits. Similarly,
Ehrlich’s model can predict not only the direction of the changes as was
the case of Heineke’s model II, but also the magnitude of the legal and il-
legal activities. Clearly, Ehrlich’s model also provides arguments for pu-
nishing repeated offenders more severely.
4. Conclusion
Some types of criminal activity are largely explicable by the rational de-
cision-making of individuals. As we could see in our survey of the early mo-
dels, namely the portfolio and time allocation model, it unsurprisingly
brings very similar results. In all cases regardless of attitudes towards
risk, ahigher probability of punishment lowers theefforts dedicated tocom-
mitting an offence. The results of the change in the severity of punishment,
the magnitude of gains from illegal activities and income are indetermi-
nate and depend on the attitude towards risk.
However, the positive models of individual decision-making to commit
a crime do not analyze many aspects of criminal activities such as how law
enforcement agents should behave in order to maximize social welfare and
the unproductive behavior of those who plan and commit crimes. The mo-
dels consider only individual decision-making and ignore interactive deci-
sion-making, as well as more than one time period decision-making, which
is crucial in analyzing e.g. marginal deterrence.22 It may be derived from
the early models that the optimal punishment is maximal. This conclusion
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22 But not all the models are comparative-static models, e.g. Allingham and Sandmo (1972) pre-
sent also a dynamic model of decision-making of the tax evader, where several time periods are
considered in the decision-making.is drawn because of the nature of the models (comparative static models).
The idea of maximal punishment was later undermined.
On the other hand, the models of individual decision-making provide
a useful introduction and a guideline to the economics of crime and high-
light the fact that it is always the rational individual who is at the center
in analyzing the consequences of decision-making.
We conclude with a quotation by Ehrlich (1973, p. 527): “Recidivism is
not necessarily the result of an offender’s myopia, erratic behavior, or lack
of self control, but may rather be the result of choice dictated by opportu-
nities.”
APPENDIX 1
Derivation of the sign of ∂µ /∂ W [equations (5), (6) and (7)]
From the first-order condition (equation (2)) we have µ = 0 and differentiating we
get:
∂ µ           ∂ µ dµ= –– dW + –– dx = 0
∂ W          ∂ x
Rearranging we have:23
∂ x ∂ µ/∂ W –– = – ––––––
∂ W        ∂ µ/∂ x
Since ∂ µ/∂ x is negative (second-order condition), it is enough to explore the sign of
∂ µ/∂ W in order to determine the sign of dx/dW. Taking the derivative of µwith re-
spect to W we get:
∂ µ                     ∂ µ              ∂ g           ∂ µ               ∂ g    ∂ f ––– = (1 – p) –––––– (WS) –– + p –––––– (WU)  –– – ––  ∂ W                ∂ x∂ W           ∂ x        ∂ x∂ W            ∂ x   ∂ x
From the first-order condition (equation (2)) we have:
∂ g          ∂ u/∂ x(WU)   ∂ g    ∂ f (1 – p) –– = – p –––––––––  –– – ––  ∂ x          ∂ u/∂ x(WS)   ∂ x    ∂ x
Combining we obtain
∂ µ ∂ u/∂ x(WU)   ∂ g    ∂ f     ∂ u                   ∂ u             ∂ g    ∂ f ––– = – p –––––––––  –– – ––  ––––– (WS) + p –––– (WU)  –– – ––  ∂ W           ∂ u/∂ x(WS)   ∂ x   ∂ x   ∂ x∂ W               ∂ x∂ W           ∂ x   ∂ x
Rearranging leads to
∂ µ ∂ g   ∂ f                        ∂ u/∂ x∂ W (WS) ∂ u/∂ x∂ W (WS) ––– = – p –– – ––  ∂ u/∂ x(WU)  – –––––––––––– –  – ––––––––––––   ∂ W           ∂ x    ∂ x                          ∂ u/∂ x (WS)               ∂ u/∂ x (WS)
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23 The more proper way would be to solve the derivation by an implicit function as it is in (Eide,
1994), however the results are the same.where
∂ u/∂ x∂ W (WS) rA (WS) = – ––––––––––––
∂ u/∂ x (WS)
and
∂ u/∂ x∂ W (WU) rA (WU) = – ––––––––––––
∂ u/∂ x (WU)
Finally, we have
∂ µ             ∂ g    ∂ f ––– = – p –– – ––  ∂ u/∂ x(WU)  rA(WS) – rA (WU)  ∂ W           ∂ x    ∂ x
Under the constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) rA (WS) = rA (WU) and that means
∂ µ/∂ W = 0. Under the decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA) rA (WS) < rA (WU)
and that means ∂ µ/∂ W > 0. Under the increasing absolute risk aversion (IARA) 
rA (WS) > rA (WU) and that means ∂ µ/∂ W < 0. We obtain these results because p and
∂ µ/∂ W (WU) are positive and the term (∂ g/∂ x – ∂ f/∂ x) is negative. If we recapitu-
late:
CARA ⇒ ∂ µ/∂ W = 0, DARA ⇒ ∂ µ/∂ W > 0 and IARA ⇒ ∂ µ/∂ W < 0.
APPENDIX 2
Derivation of ∂µ /∂β <0 ,∂µ /∂ p <0and ∂µ /∂α >0from equation (8)
We employ the same technique as in Appendix 1.
First, we show how the severity of fines effects the criminal activity and how
the result depends on the attitude towards risk:
∂µ          ∂µ
dµ= –– dβ + –– dx = 0
∂β           ∂ x
Rearranging we get:
dx        ∂ µ/∂ β
–– = – ––––––
dβ ∂ µ/∂ x
and then
∂ µ ∂ u             ∂ g    ∂ f    ∂ u            ∂ f      ∂ u           ∂ f
––– = p –––– (WU)  –– – ––  –– (WU)   – ––  + –– (WU) ––––  ∂ β ∂ x∂ β ∂ x    ∂ x   ∂ x            ∂ β ∂ x         ∂ x∂ β
For a risk-averse and risk-neutral individual µ β is obviously always negative. For
a risk-loving individual the result is uncertain, but if the following inequality holds:
∂ u             ∂ g    ∂ f   ∂ u             ∂ f       ∂ u          ∂ f
–––– (WU)  –– – ––  –– (WU)   – ––  < –– (WU) ––––
∂ x∂ β ∂ x    ∂ x   ∂ x             ∂ β ∂ x         ∂ x∂ β
then ∂ µ/∂ β < 0, too.
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ses the criminal activity of the individual:
∂ µ ∂ u         ∂ g    ∂ u          ∂ g    ∂ f
––– = – –– (WS) –– + –– (WS)  –– – ––  < 0
∂ p        ∂ x         ∂ x    ∂ x           ∂ x    ∂ x
Third, we show how the magnitude of the gain affects illegal activity. After some
algebra we get:
∂ µ ∂ u ∂ g     ∂ g         ∂ EU/∂ W
––– = ––– –– + ––––  – ––––––––  ∂ α ∂ W  ∂ x   ∂ x∂ α ∂ µ/∂ x
Since we already derived CARA ⇒ ∂ µ/∂ W = 0, DARA ⇒ ∂ µ/∂ W > 0 and IARA ⇒
∂ µ/∂ W < 0. ∂ µ/∂ x < 0 is a sufficient condition for maximizing the expected utility and
∂ g/∂ α > 0. Then we only have to assume the marginal gain must increase, that is
∂ g/∂ x∂ α > 0, and can derive the sign of dx/dα .
As a result, for decreasing absolute risk aversion and constant absolute risk aver-
sion we obtain ∂ µ/∂ α > 0. The bigger the gain the more illegal activities will be pre-
sent. The outcome under increasing absolute risk aversion is indeterminate.
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Individual Decision-Making to Commit a Crime
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The authors provide a survey of the most important findings of the early models
of the economics of crime, namely the models of Becker, Ehrlich and Heineke. These
models study rational individual decision-making about entering into illegal activi-
ties. Probability and size of punishment, attitudes towards risk, gains from crime
and income are the main variables influencing the results of individual behavior.
The authors also discuss weaknesses of these models such as their static nature or
the absence of interactive decision-making. The relationship to the theory of opti-
mal law enforcement is also presented.
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